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Entitlement to Substantive Due Process: Old versus
New Property in Land Use Regulation
Daniel R. Mandelker*
Legal discussion of land use regulation usually features the
Takings Clause. The Supreme Court changed land use law by striking
down land use restrictions as a taking of property,1 producing what
some have called a takings revolution. Yet, this so-called revolution
has had little practical effect. Except in cases that strike down
developer exactions,2 Supreme Court decisions rarely have changed
the outcome.3
This fascination with the Takings Clause demands correction.
Takings cases have a limited focus; they usually occur when a
municipality applies a legitimate, but targeted, regulation that affects
a single or limited group of landowners. An example is wetlands
regulation that severely restricts use of property.4
* Stamper Professor of Law, Washington University. The author would like to thank
Kenneth Bley, Steven P. Eagle, John D. Echeverria, Frances Foster, Jules Gerard, Jerold S.
Kayden, Richard Levy, Ronal Levin, Stuart Meck and Dan Tarlock for their helpful comments.
I would also like to thank Monica A. Sylvan for her research.
1. Its most recent decision is City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687 (1999), discussed in Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes, Good Faith, and Land
Use Regulation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10100 (2000), and John D. Echeverria, Revving the Engines
in Neutral: City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10682
(1999).
2. Even here, however, the cases are about evenly divided in accepting dedications for
off-site streets and highways. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 9.16 (4th ed.
1997 & Supp. 1999) [hereinafter LAND USE LAW]. For cases striking down such dedications,
see, e.g., Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998) (invalidating a dedication for
an adjacent street as condition to rezoning based on possibility of commercial development
when there were no present plans for such a development), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1355 (1999);
Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
3. See David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives
on Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal
Courts are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1999); Glenn P. Sugamelli, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth
Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the “Rule,” 29 ENVTL. L. 939 (2000).
4. Takings claims seldom succeed even in these cases. See LAND USE LAW, supra note
2, at § 12.04. For a case finding a takings violation in a wetlands permit denial, see Florida
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. cl. 21 (1999).
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There are other, equally important, land use cases where that
present different issues. In these cases a municipality has adopted a
land use regulation that carries out legitimate purposes, but a
landowner claims that the municipality has applied the regulation
arbitrarily.5 In the usual case a landowner makes a development
proposal more intensive than the municipality prefers, the
municipality finds some reason to reject it, and the developer claims
that the rejection is arbitrary.6 For example, consider a landowner
who owns land zoned for multifamily use. Under the zoning
ordinance the planning commission must approve a site plan for any
development before it can issue a building permit. The planning
commission instructs the landowner that she must reduce the density
of the multifamily development to comply with the site plan
ordinance, but this is the first time the municipality has demanded a
density reduction in a site plan submission. The landowner refuses,
arguing correctly that the site plan ordinance does not impose such a
requirement. The municipality then rejects the site plan, preventing
the developer from proceeding with the project.7
What recourse does the developer have? A takings claim is
possible if the rejection of the site plan leaves the land without an
economically viable use, but because the property is zoned for
5. The major increase in suburban population in recent decades, along with suburban
incorporations and annexations, has shifted the arena in which most land use decisions occur.
This shift may explain why arbitrary land use decision making is more of a problem. Special
interest groups may capture suburban governments and use their land use powers in an arbitrary
manner by opposing new developments for unpopular land uses, such as group homes for the
disabled, or opposing developments because of political or personal motives.
Substantive due process claims also arise when a local government adopts a land use
regulation that does not serve a legitimate governmental purpose; exclusionary zoning is an
example. This type of regulation presents different problems because the facial text of the
ordinance, not its application, creates the substantive invalidity. The entitlement rule does not
apply when the constitutional infirmity is facial.
6. Most of the recent takings cases the Supreme Court has decided have been cases
where a municipality’s land use decision was arbitrary. For example, in City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999), a developer scaled down its development
several times in response to the city’s objections, but the city ultimately rejected the
development. Id. at 693-94. The developer sued and won on a takings claim. Id. at 694.
7. This example is not far-fetched. See Kosinski v. Lawlor, 418 A.2d 66, 68 (Conn.
1979) (stating that a municipality may not use site plan review to reject a site plan for a
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multifamily use, this claim cannot stand. The landowner also will not
have a takings claim under the takings test that requires a land use
regulation to serve a legitimate governmental interest.8 Site plan
review meets this requirement.9 The problem is the decision to apply
the site plan ordinance in an arbitrary way.
An equal protection claim is possible if the municipality does not
require a density reduction from other site plan applicants who
proposed a development that the zoning ordinance allows.10 The
landowner in the hypothetical then argues that the decision is unfair
because the municipality treated other applicants differently.11
However, the equal protection clause does not reach the situation
where a municipality acted arbitrarily but did not treat similar cases
differently.12
Finally, the developer may have a due process claim. A
procedural due process claim exists if the decision-making process is
improper or unfair, but these facts do not present this problem. The
developer can also claim that the municipality’s decision violates
substantive due process because it was arbitrary.13 Substantive due
8. See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
9. See Lionel’s Appliance Center, Inc. v. Citta, 383 A.2d 773 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1978) (discussing the purposes of site plan review).
10. An equal protection claim has the advantage in that it only demands equal protection
in the treatment of persons.  It does not require the claimant to have a property interest. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
11. See Thomas v. City of West Haven, 734 A.2d 535 (Conn. 1999) (finding an equal
protection violation when the city demanded a site plan when no similar demands were made on
other developers). The landowner might also be able to claim an equal protection violation if
she could show that the commission demanded a density reduction out of vindictiveness toward
the landowner. See Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000). However, equal
protection claims that do not implicate fundamental interests or suspect classifications may fail
in court for other reasons. Courts usually reject claims of arbitrary and unfair decisions in these
cases by finding reasons to support the municipality’s decisions. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER
ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW § 2.04[3] (1999) [hereinafter FEDERAL LAND USE LAW].
12. Consider, for example an application for a development that a municipality has never
heard of before, such as an application for a group home for the disabled, rejected for an
arbitrary reason, such as the fears of neighbors. See, e.g., Marks v. City of Chesapeake, Va.,
883 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989) (overturning council denial of a permit for a palmistry and
fortune-telling business because it was tainted with “religious considerations”).
13. The developer can also sue in state court, claiming that the state zoning statute does
not authorize the density reduction requirement or that it is unconstitutional under the state
constitution. See LAND USE LAW, supra note 2, at § 6.68. The landowner may also join state
and federal constitutional claims, and may have to do so if federal courts in her circuit require
plaintiffs to ripen equal protection and due process cases in state courts. See FEDERAL LAND
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process claims present problems not faced by other constitutional
claims because courts have rules that keep them out of court. Some
federal circuits, for example, apply the Supreme Court rule that a
plaintiff may not bring a substantive due process claim when a more
specific constitutional provision is available.14 These rules do not
apply to takings or equal protection claims.15 This Article examines
USE LAW, supra note 11, at § 4A.02[6].
14. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996), applying Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989) (stating that claims of use of excessive force must be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment). This rule also applies in zoning cases. See Macri v.
King County, 126 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, Mich.,
961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992). For a further discussion see Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo
Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot” Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086
(1998).
The Eleventh Circuit has a rule that denies substantive due process protection to when a
government action is executive. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995). This rule is inconsistent with a 1998 Supreme Court decision,
which applied substantive due process to executive actions. See County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). See also David H. Armistead, Substantive Due Process Limits on
Public Officials’ Power to Terminate State-Created Property Interests, 29 GA. L. REV. 769
(1995).
A few other courts of appeals have adopted the view, advanced by Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229-30
(1985), that substantive due process protects only fundamental constitutional rights and not
state-created property interests. See, e.g., Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1990). But
see Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 161 F.2d 1215-23 (allowing the property owner to
challenge zoning decisions as a violation of substantive due process). See also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 579 (1997).
Federal courts also limit their review in substantive due process cases by adopting a
deferential standard of judicial review or other limitations that limit the cases in which they can
find substantive due process violations. See, e.g., New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village
of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring a plaintiff to show that the land use
decision was arbitrary and irrational and that the decision-makers either committed another
substantive constitutional violation or that state remedies are inadequate). The cases are
collected by circuit in FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note 11, § 2.02[1][b] n.7.3.
15. Another rule, which probably would cover the hypothetical described at the beginning
of this Article, applies to both due process and equal protection claims. It holds that those
claims are not actionable under § 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act if they are “run of the
mill” land use disputes. This rule originated in the First Circuit. See, e.g., Creative Env’ts, Inc.
v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1982). Courts adopting this rule hold that this kind of
dispute does not implicate federal constitutional concerns even though it presents a federal
constitutional claim. They do, however, state that they will entertain the constitutional claim if
the municipal behavior is egregious, or where there is a gross abuse of power, invidious
discrimination, or fundamentally unfair procedures. Id. This exception suggests that the rule
may simply be a restatement of the deferential review standard that courts apply in substantive
due process and equal protection cases. But see Welch v. Paicos, 66 F. Supp.2d 138 (D. Mass.
1999) (“In the rough-and-tumble politics of land-use planning, very little can shock the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/4
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an important rule that bars a substantive due process action when a
landowner claims that a municipality has arbitrarily denied a
development approval. This rule holds that a landowner cannot
challenge the denial unless he has an entitlement to the approval.
Because judicial acceptance of new property interests is quite
recent, we can call this entitlement a “new property” interest. New
property is different from “old property,” which is the property
interest in the ownership of the land. In the hypothetical at the
beginning of this Article, the landowner does not have an entitlement
that creates new property if the municipality can approve or deny the
site plan at its discretion.16
The new property requirement comes from the text of the Fifth
Amendment, carried over to the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides that no state shall deprive any person of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”17 Supreme Court decisions
created the new property in cases where jobholders claimed that
procedural due process required a hearing before their governmental
employers could terminate them. These cases held that a hearing was
necessary only if the jobholders had a property right, or
“entitlement,” to their jobs. A mere expectation in employment was
not enough.
The Supreme Court has never decided whether the entitlement
rule applies in a case where a landowner claims that a local
governmental decision on a land use application is arbitrary. Despite
the lack of Supreme Court guidance, lower federal courts always
apply the entitlement rule in procedural due process cases.18 A
constitutional conscience.”).
Other circuits have adopted the First Circuit rule. E.g., Norton v. Village of Corrales, 103
F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 1996); Gardner v. City of Baltimore Mayor & City Council, 969 F.2d 63
(4th Cir. 1992); Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1992);
Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988); Burrell v. City of
Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1987) (rezoning); Hynes v. Pasco County, 801 F.2d 1269
(11th Cir. 1986) (revocation of building permit); Smith v. City of Picayune, 795 F.2d 482 (5th
Cir. 1986) (rezoning). For additional citations, see FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note 11, at
§ 4.03[3][a].
16. Courts may rigorously examine the requirements of land use ordinances to determine
whether they confer the discretion to approve or deny a land use approval. See infra notes 78-87
and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
18. See infra note 76.
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majority apply it in substantive due process cases when landowners
claim that a municipal decision arbitrarily prohibits the development
of their land.19
The entitlement rule that courts apply to bar substantive due
process claims in land use cases keeps landowners out of court. If a
landowner does not have an entitlement, a court can dismiss a
substantive due process claim without giving him an opportunity to
show he can succeed on the merits. Because it allows a municipality
to decide if it wants to create an entitlement, the entitlement rule is
also circular. A municipality simply has to announce in its land use
regulations that land use approvals, such as site plan approvals, do
not confer an entitlement.20 The municipality accomplishes this by
adopting a land use ordinance that gives it the discretion to grant or
refuse the approval. This discretion defeats a claim of entitlement,
which exists only if a municipality has a mandatory duty to grant the
approval. An interest in the property for which the municipality
denied approval to develop is insufficient.
Courts take a different view under the Takings Clause. The
Takings Clause is part of the Fifth Amendment and contains a
property requirement. It states that “private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”21 Courts always
have held that old property land ownership is enough of a property
interest for a takings claim.22
Substantive due process provides the basis for reviewing claims
that a municipality’s land use decision does not serve legitimate
governmental interests because the decision is arbitrary. The
hypothetical at the beginning of this Article poses this problem. Part I
considers whether courts can review legitimacy claims under the
Takings Clause. Although the Supreme Court has held that the
Takings Clause authorizes legitimacy review, the Court may no
19. See infra note 77.
20. I use the word “announce” intentionally because, as noted later, the Supreme Court
has rejected an announcement rule in its interpretation of the takings clause. See infra note 121
and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. This holding is axiomatic. The very point of a takings case is that a municipality’s
refusal to allow a more intensive development is a taking of property. The landowner is not
required to show an entitlement to the approval.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/4
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longer believe in this proposition. It is also unclear whether judicial
review of legitimacy under the Takings Clause is more rigorous than
it is under substantive due process. Answers to these questions are
important. If courts cannot review legitimacy claims under the
takings clause, they can review them only in substantive due process
cases. However, courts use the entitlement rule to bar substantive due
process cases. Even if courts review legitimacy claims under
substantive due process, judicial review may be less rigorous than it
would be under the Takings Clause.
Part II explains the entitlement rule, its origins in job termination
cases where employees made procedural due process claims, and its
application to land use cases. Part III then considers whether the
entitlement rule should apply to substantive due process cases
brought by landowners who claim that a land use decision is
arbitrary. This Part also examines the Supreme Court’s rejection of
the entitlement rule in takings cases, and whether this rejection
should apply to substantive due process cases brought by landowners.
Part IV concludes that precedent does not clearly indicate whether
courts should apply an entitlement rule to substantive due process
claims that a municipal decision to prohibit the development of land
is arbitrary. However, judicial reliance on the absolute bar of an
entitlement rule prevents courts from considering the policy reasons
that should drive access to courts. These reasons suggest that the
entitlement rule is wrong.
I. LEGITIMACY CLAIMS IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND
TAKINGS CASES23
The judicial activism of the Lochner Era casts a shadow on
23. See generally John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due
Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695 (1993); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against
Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due
Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1991); J. Michael McGuinness & Lisa A. McGuinness
Parlagreco, The Reemergence of Substantive Due Process as a Constitutional Tort: Theory,
Proof, and Damages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1129 (1990). See also Thomas E. Roberts et al.,
Land Use Litigation: Doctrinal Confusion Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 28
URB. LAW. 765 (1996).
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substantive due process.24 The Lochner era acquired its bad
reputation because Supreme Court decisions applied substantive due
process to strike down legislation that advanced important social and
economic objectives. It is not surprising, then, that the Supreme
Court has a mixed record in applying substantive due process to land
use regulations. The Court has upheld land use regulations against
substantive due process attacks, but has struck down regulations it
considers unacceptable.25 Lower federal courts have also expressed
concern about the role of substantive due process in constitutional
jurisprudence.26
Despite the Court’s mixed record in deciding substantive due
process claims in land use cases, it has brought substantive due
process concerns into takings law through the first prong27 of a
takings test the Court adopted in Agins v. City of Tiburon.28 Under the
first Agins prong, a land use regulation violates the Takings Clause if
it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.29 This
prong always has been a mystery because the overlap with
substantive due process is obvious. It is not clear why the Court used
the Takings Clause to duplicate an inquiry into legitimacy that can
24. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(noting that the history of the Lochner era suggests caution and restraint in applying substantive
due process as basis for judicial intervention). See generally Richard E. Levy, Escaping
Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV.
329 (1995).
25. Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a limitation
on nonrelated persons who could live together), with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977) (invalidating housing code that contained restrictive definition of family that could
live together). See Levinson, supra note 23.
26. For a discussion of the difficulty of placing limits on substantive due process in a land
use case, see Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988).
27. The second Agins prong is the well-known requirement that a land use regulation is a
taking if it denies a landowner an economically viable use of her land. Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Court’s statement of the second prong varies. See Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (“[C]ategorical treatment [is] appropriate
. . . where regulation denies all economically viable or productive use of land.”). The Court also
used similar phrases, such as “all economically feasible use” and “all economically beneficial
use.” Id. at 1016-17 n.7.
28. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The Court cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), which is usually read as invalidating a zoning classification as a violation of substantive
due process. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
29. “The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. . . .” Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/4
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also occur under substantive due process.
There is substantial criticism of the first Agins prong,30 and some
confusion with regard to how the Court intends to apply it. The Court
has found a taking based on the first prong only when the government
demanded a physical dedication of land as a condition to land use
approval.31 If first prong inquiry under the takings clause is limited to
this kind of case, it does not apply to a claim that a land use
regulation is a taking when there is no physical dedication.
However, the Court approved a jury instruction based on the first
prong in a case where it affirmed an award of compensation in a
regulatory taking case.32 The Court did not indicate its views on the
first prong because it pointed out that the municipality had approved
the instruction.33 The state courts disagree on the role of the first
Agins prong in takings law. They disagree on whether a taking occurs
when a land use regulation does not serve a legitimate governmental
interest or when the landowner cannot show a loss in value that
satisfies the second Agins prong.34
If the first Agins prong is still viable, another problem is that
judicial review of legitimacy under the takings clause may be more
rigorous than judicial review of legitimacy under substantive due
process. A debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan in
30. See John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate
Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853 (1999); Jerold S.
Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan
Invitation (Part I), 23 URB. LAW. 301, 317-27 (1991).
31. E.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
32. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999). The Court indicated
that the instruction was consistent with its views on regulatory takings liability, but also noted
the city did not object to the takings principles on which the court based its instruction. Id. The
Court also appeared to reaffirm the first Agins prong by holding that a jury trial is available in
takings cases and by indicating that it could be available on questions raised under the Agins
first prong. Id. at 693, 720-22.
33. Id. at 1644.
34. See also Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc., v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971
(N.Y. 1999) (rejecting first prong claim in case where landowner did not claim denial of all
economically viable use); Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Council of the City of Richmond Heights, 690
N.E.2d 510 (Ohio 1998)(need only show absence of legitimate purpose if denial of
economically viable use not alleged). Compare 152 Valparaiso Assoc. v. City of Cotati, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 551, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (requiring only a showing of improper purpose) and
City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So.2d 1377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994), with Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995),
and Estate & Heirs of Sanchez v. County of Bernalillo, 902 P.2d 550, 552 (N.M. 1995).
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission suggests that judicial
review of governmental purpose under the takings clause may be
more rigorous.35
Justice Brennan’s dissent explained that a reasonable relationship
standard applies when courts review legitimacy questions under
substantive due process. He argued the same standard of judicial
review should apply when courts review legitimacy issues under the
Takings Clause.36 A footnote by Justice Scalia, who wrote the
majority opinion, disagreed. He held that courts should apply a
heightened standard of judicial review under the Takings Clause.
This standard of review requires a government regulation to
“‘substantially advance’ the ‘legitimate state interest’ sought to be
achieved.”37 So far, however, Justice Scalia’s footnote has not
attracted a following, as courts have rejected it.38 Commentators have
also ridiculed it as lacking a sound foundation.39
This discussion of substantive due process and its overlap with the
Takings Clause40 raises an important problem created by the
35. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
36. Id. at 842-47. Justice Brennan would apply the traditional reasonableness test. Id. at
845 n.1.
37. Id. at 834 n.3 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260 (1980)).
38. See South County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834,
836 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding a land use ordinance under the Takings and substantive Due
Process Clauses and holding that inquiry into governmental purpose is the same under both
clauses); Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971 (N.Y. 1999)
(applying deferential standard of judicial review in first prong case); Builders Service Corp. v.
Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 545 A.2d 530, 540 (Conn. 1988) (stating that a regulation must be
“reasonably related” to a legitimate purpose).
39. See Kayden, supra note 30, at 314 (“Justice Scalia’s novel conclusion . . . [was] based
on shoddy scholarship and shallow analysis.”).
40. Another difference between judicial review under substantive Due Process and under
the Takings Clause is that courts apply ripeness rules to determine whether a takings case is
ready for litigation. See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985). Courts may not apply these rules to an as-applied substantive due
process claim. Under these rules the takings claimant must obtain a final decision from the local
decision-making body and must file a claim for compensation in state court before bringing a
federal takings claim in federal court. When the landowner returns to federal court, res judicata
may bar the takings claim. These rules have kept most as-applied takings claims out of federal
court. Legislation introduced in Congress would repeal the rule requiring takings claimants to
sue in state court first and would modify the final decision rule so that it will be less likely to
bar takings suits. See TESTIMONY OF DANIEL R. MANDELKER on H.R. 1534 BEFORE THE
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (1997), reprinted in John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio,
Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness Mess”? A Call for Reform so Takings Plaintiffs can enter the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/4
p+61+Mandelker.doc 01/04/01
2000] Entitlement to Substantive Due Process 71
entitlement rule. The problem arises because substantive due process
provides the only opportunity for reviewing the legitimacy of
government regulation if courts cannot review legitimacy questions
under the Takings Clause. Assigning legitimacy review to substantive
due process means that no review of legitimacy will occur at all if the
entitlement rule bars landowners’ substantive due process claims by
landowners.41
Another problem concerns the extent to which courts review
legitimacy questions under substantive due process. The reasonable
relationship standard urged by Justice Brennan is so deferential that
courts could rarely, if ever, upset a land use decision because it does
not serve a legitimate governmental purpose. It is essential, however,
to be clear about the cases in which courts apply this standard. Courts
apply a relaxed review standard when the question is whether a
municipality should have adopted a different or arguably better
policy in its land use regulations.42 They do not apply this standard
when the purpose of the regulation is legitimate, but a landowner
claims that a municipality’s application of the regulation was
arbitrary. Courts will strike down the decision if the landowner
proves her claim.43 This is the type of case described in the
Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 232-53 (1999). The courts differ on if, and the extent
to which, they will apply ripeness rules to substantive due process claims. See FEDERAL LAND
USE LAW, supra note 11, at § 4A.02[6].
There may also be a difference in remedy. In his dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 n.23 (1981), Justice Brennan suggested
that compensation would not be payable “where a police power regulation is not enacted in
furtherance of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare so that there may be no
‘public use’” but that the landowner would then have an action for damages under § 1983.
41. Presumably, courts would still be willing to review legitimacy questions when
litigants bring facial attacks against land use regulations. The entitlement rule does not apply in
these cases.
42. See, e.g., Restigouche v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding
an ordinance excluding automobile dealerships from a limited commercial zone to establish an
aesthetically pleasing highway corridor and preserve identifiable, traditional downtown). For
citations, by circuit, to cases adopting a deferential standard of judicial review in substantive
due process cases, see FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note 11, at § 2.02[1][a] n.7.3.
43. See Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing the denial of a
plaintiff’s building permit that met all permit requirements); Moore v. City of Tallahassee, 928
F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (claiming the city applied a zoning ordinance to depress the
value of property prior to acquisition).
The Supreme Court applies an arbitrary and irrational standard to the review of legislative
action but applies a “shocks the conscience” test to the review of executive action. County of
Washington University Open Scholarship
p+61+Mandelker.doc 01/04/01
72 Festschrift [Vol. 3:61
hypothetical at the beginning of this Article, in which courts use the
entitlement rule to bar landowner substantive due process claims.
II. THE ENTITLEMENT BARRIER44
A. Its Origins
The entitlement rule that created the new property began with two
landmark Supreme Court cases decided in the early 1970s.45 These
cases decided whether procedural due process guaranteed two
professors the right to a hearing when their universities terminated
their employment. Neither individual had tenure, so the issue was
whether they had property protected under the due process clause
despite their lack of tenure status.
This issue arose because, without tenure, neither professor had
property rights antecedent to their employment that guaranteed job
continuation. Their lack of tenure triggered the time-honored right
versus privilege doctrine. Under this doctrine continued employment
by the university was a privilege that the university could either grant
or withhold without having to provide procedural guarantees.
At the time these cases came to the Court, however, the right
versus privilege doctrine was under heavy attack,46 primarily as
applied to welfare and other benefits. An influential article almost a
decade previous characterized these benefits as “The New
Property.”47 It argued for the abolition of the right versus privilege
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). The Court explained that only “the most egregious
official conduct” could be held arbitrary under the Constitution. Id. at 846. However, conduct
like that in Bateson clearly violates substantive due process even under this test. See Harold A.
Ellis, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of Zoning, 7 J. LAND USE &
ENVT’L L. 275 (1992).
44. For other discussions of the entitlement rule as applied to land use disputes raising
substantive due process claims, see Kenneth B. Bley & Tina R. Axelrad, The Search for
Constitutionally Protected “Property” In Land-Use, 29 URB. LAW. 251 (1997); Stewart M.
Wiener, Substantive Due Process in the Twilight Zone: Protecting Property Interests from
Arbitrary Land Use Decisions, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1467 (1996).
45. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
46. For an argument that the entitlement rule is simply a continuation of the right versus
privilege doctrine, see Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982).
47. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964).
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doctrine as applied to government benefits and for the recognition of
“new” property rights in these benefits that courts should protect.48
In the university job termination cases, the Court explicitly noted
it had rejected the right versus privilege doctrine.49 Perry v.
Sindermann50 adopted the entitlement requirement to take its place.
As the Court put it, the question was whether the professors had an
entitlement to the benefit of a university position that would entitle
them to a procedural due process hearing.51 “A person’s interest in a
benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there are
such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim
of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.”52
The companion case, Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth,53 added that a unilateral “expectation” is not property: “To have
a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.”54 Then, in an important qualification that has
strategic significance for entitlements to property, Roth held that state
law defines whether a property right exists:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law— rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits.55
48. Just prior to Roth and Perry, the Court found a statutory entitlement to welfare
benefits that entitled a welfare recipient to a hearing on a benefit termination. Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (citing Reich, supra note 47).
49. “[T]he Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and
‘privileges’ that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.”
Roth, 408 U.S. at 571.
50. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
51. Id. at 596.
52. Id. at 601 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
53. 408 U.S. 564.
54. Id. at 577.
55. Id. However, the Constitution provides the minimum procedural due process
requirements. They are not diminished because a state or municipality provides its own
procedures, which it considers adequate. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
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Finally, the Court made it clear that its decision covered only the
new property in public benefits, not the old property, such as the
ownership of real estate: “The Court has also made clear that the
property interests protected by procedural due process extend well
beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”56 This
statement suggests that the entitlement rule was intended to expand
rather than diminish property rights, and that land ownership requires
constitutional protection even if a landowner does not have an
entitlement to a land use approval.
B. A Critique of the Entitlement Rule
Commentators have attacked57 and defended58 Roth and Perry
since the Court decided these cases. They were a major departure in
the treatment of procedural due process guarantees as applied to
government benefits, but the Court offered no precedent and no real
explanation for its decisions. It rejected the approach of the district
court, which “after assessing and balancing the weights of the
particular interests involved,” held that procedural due process
required a hearing on employment termination.59 Yet the Court did
not explain why the balancing test was unsatisfactory.60
The Court also qualified the entitlement rule in a way that
significantly narrows the cases where courts can find an entitlement.
The most damaging qualification was the rule that state law defines
the entitlements that courts can recognize. In subsequent cases, the
541-42 (1985). See also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that state law defines property rights but the state
may not invoke a nonexistent property right to defeat a constitutional claim).
56. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72. The rest of this Article is redundant if this statement means
that ownership of real estate is enough of a property interest for a substantive due process claim.
I do not make this assumption because the lower federal courts have applied the entitlement rule
to bar substantive due process claims brought by landowners.
57. E.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV.
1044 (1984); Mark Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive
Due Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 261.
58. E.g., Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth
and Perry, 71 CAL. L. REV. 146 (1983) (defending Roth and Perry in the employment context
because these cases preclude courts from reviewing discretionary actions).
59. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570.




2000] Entitlement to Substantive Due Process 75
Court interpreted this requirement to find an entitlement only if state
law mandated the government to grant a benefit, such as a parole
from prison.61 This rule means that the entitlement rule is circular
because government can define when an entitlement exists. A statute
or ordinance can defeat an entitlement by conferring discretion to
grant or withhold a benefit, and courts must accept this decision.62
A Seventh Circuit police promotion case, Bigby v. City of
Chicago,63 explains how the authority to exercise discretion defeats
an entitlement claim. Intervenors challenged a police examination for
promotion to lieutenant, claiming that it did not relate to the job
duties of police officers.64 Although the court noted that the statute
and ordinance created an expectation that promotion examinations
would be fair,65 Illinois cases had held that these expectations are not
“firm and definite,” and are not property “in a constitutional sense.”66
Promotion was a matter of discretion.67
Cases like Bigby have an impact on land use decision making that
is usually fatal to the creation of an entitlement. The administration of
zoning ordinances is “flexible.” This means that the zoning ordinance
confers discretion on the zoning body to decide whether it should
grant the land use approvals it authorizes, such as site plan
approvals.68 Because the decision whether to grant an approval is
discretionary, a landowner does not have an entitlement to it. The site
plan hypothetical at the beginning of this Article is a good example.
61. See, e.g., Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981) (“The
Connecticut commutation statute, having no definitions, no criteria, and no mandated ‘shalls,’
creates no analagous duty or constitutional entitlement.”). See also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.
Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 276 (1998) (following Dumschat).
62. See Tim Searchinger, Note, The Procedural Due Process Approach to Administrative
Discretion: The Courts’ Inverted Analysis, 95 YALE L.J. 1017, 1019 (1986). See also
Richardson v. Township of Brady, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 15520, at 30 (6th Cir. July 5, 2000)
(Ryan, concurring; the entitlement rule “is a test devoid of intelligibility and indeed a model of
circular reasoning”).
63. 766 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1985).
64. Id. at 1055.
65. Id. at 1156.
66. Id. at 1056 (citations omitted).
67. Id. (citations omitted).
68. See LAND USE LAW, supra note 2, at §§ 6.68.
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C. The Entitlement Rule in As-Applied Substantive Due Process
Cases Brought by Landowners
1. The Problem
This Article is not another attack on the entitlement rule. Instead, I
will assume that the entitlement rule, as applied to procedural due
process claims, is correct.69 The question is whether courts should
apply this rule in substantive due process cases where a landowner
attacks the merits of a land use decision, not just a failure to provide a
hearing. The problem in deciding whether the entitlement rule should
apply in these cases is that a land use disapproval is not the type of
case presented in Roth and Perry. These were termination of
employment cases. The analogue in the land use context is a decision
by a municipality to revoke a building permit that it previously
issued.
When a municipality attempts to revoke a building permit, the
courts apply a vested rights doctrine that is similar to the entitlement
rule but stretches further because it protects the permit from
rescission.70 A municipality violates substantive due process if it
revokes a building permit when the landowner has a vested right in
it,71 but may revoke the permit if the landowner does not have a
69. One reviewer who read an earlier draft of this Article pointed out that the application
of the entitlement rule to procedural due process cases may be correct. These cases challenge
the deprivation of a regulatory benefit, not the deprivation of the land itself, so that requiring an
entitlement to the benefit may be reasonable.
70. The vested rights doctrine confers constitutional protection on property rights that a
landowner has acquired in the use of his land. An alternative doctrine protects a landowner if
she can show that a municipality is estopped from making a more restrictive change in a zoning
ordinance that affects her property. Under the majority rule she can do this by proving that she
has made substantial expenditures based on a good faith reliance on a building permit that the
municipality has issued. Courts apply the same rule when deciding whether a landowner has
acquired a vested right and usually view the estoppel and vested right rules as equivalents. See
LAND USE LAW, supra note 2, at §§ 6.12-6.21.
71. See, e.g., Mont Belvieu Square, Ltd. v. City of Mont Belvieu, 27 F. Supp.2d 935 (S.D.
Tex. 1998); Decarion v. Monroe County, 853 F. Supp. 1415 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Mount Sinai
Medical Center of Greater Miami, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 706 F. Supp. 1525 (S.D. Fla.
1989); Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1988).
In procedural due process cases a landowner is protected if he has a vested right in the use
of his land. E.g., Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.
1991). The landowner is also protected if the requested land use is permitted at the time he
makes an application for a building permit. E.g., Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497
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vested right in it. This rule means that courts view the building permit
as a governmental approval in which the landowner must have a
property right. This rule makes sense because the municipality
previously decided to approve the landowner’s development
proposal. There is no question of an entitlement to an approval; the
question is whether the municipality can revoke it.
The analogue in the employment context to the landowner who
applies for a development approval is the applicant who applies for
an employment position. There clearly is no entitlement in this
situation. As Justice Holmes said long ago, no one has a right to be a
policeman.72 If an applicant for employment does not have an
entitlement to it, then the applicant for a land use approval does not
have an entitlement to it either. There is then no constitutional basis
for attacking the municipality should it deny the approval. This
should be the end of the story, unless the old property interest the
landowner has in the land makes a difference. That is the next
question.
2. How the Courts Apply the Entitlement Rule to Land Use
Approvals
The Supreme Court has never decided a case where a landowner
claimed that a land use decision, as applied to his property, was a
violation of substantive due process.73 It has only decided substantive
due process cases that were facial attacks on land use legislation.74
Without a Supreme Court decision, lower federal and state courts
(9th Cir. 1990). See FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note 11, at § 2.03[3].
72. When he was on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in a case where a
policeman was discharged for disobeying regulations prohibiting political activity, Justice
Holmes held that “[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.” Mccauliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(1892).
73. The court granted certiorari in a run-of-the-mill zoning dispute that raised substantive
due process questions but dismissed the writ after oral argument. PFZ Properties, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991), writ dismissed as improvidently granted, 503 U.S. 257
(1992). Neither has it considered a land use case where a landowner claimed a land use decision
violated procedural due process.
74. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), is an example. This case was a
facial attack on a zoning ordinance limiting the number of unrelated persons who could live
together.
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alone must decide the entitlement issue. All courts find an entitlement
if a landowner has a vested right in a development for which he seeks
approval.75 They will then require a municipality to approve a
landowner’s development proposal.
If a landowner does not have a vested right, courts do not carry
over the rule in employment cases that a job applicant does not have
an entitlement to employment. If they did this rule would be enough
to require dismissal of the landowner’s case. Instead, courts divert
attention from the ownership issue by concentrating on the land use
approval and by asking whether a landowner has an entitlement to the
approval. Courts unanimously apply the entitlement rule to dismiss
procedural due process claims in land use cases where a municipality
has denied a land use approval.76 Most courts also deny substantive
due process claims in these cases.77 They do not believe the old
property interest of the landowner makes a significant difference. The
question is whether the majority view in substantive due process
75. E.g., Decarion v. Monroe County, 853 F. Supp 1415, 1419 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Brady v.
Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Sudarsky v. City of New
York, 779 F. Supp. 287, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no entitlement), aff’d, 969 F.2d 1041 (2d
Cir. 1992).
76. E.g., Sylvia Dev. Co. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving
rezoning); Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 1994) (involving the
enforcement of a zoning ordinance); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927
F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991) (involving rezoning and finding that a federal court is not bound by
a state determination of what is legislative); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1990)
(involving a water connection); Walker v. City of Kansas City, 911 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1990)
(involving rezoning); Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving an approval
of a plat); Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1985) (involving a junkyard
permit); United Land Corp. of America v. Clarke, 613 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1980). For additional
citations see FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note 11, at § 2.03[3] n.23.
77. For cases refusing to find an entitlement, see, for example: DLC Mgt. Corp. v. Town
of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding no entitlement to existing zoning);
Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997); Norton v. Village of
Corrales, 103 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 1996) (involving a subdivision approval); Triomphe Investors
v. City of Northwood, 49 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 1995) (involving a special use permit); Sylvia Dev.
Co. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving an approval of a transfer zone);
MacKenzie v. City of Rockledge, 920 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1991) (involving a building permit);
Deepwells Estates Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Head of the Harbor, 973 F. Supp. 338
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991). Courts applying the entitlement rule may sometimes find an entitlement. E.g., Village
Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving a special permit); Scott v.
Greenville County, 716 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1983) (involving a building permit). For additional
citations see FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note 11, at § 2.02[1][c].
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cases is correct.
A Second Circuit case, RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village
of Southampton,78 is the leading case that applies the entitlement rule
to substantive due process claims in land use cases. A developer sued
the village and village officials, claiming that a denial of a building
permit to renovate a mansion and surrounding oceanfront property
violated substantive due process.79 The court noted that Roth and
Perry were limited to employment and procedural due process issues
but “were potentially pertinent to land regulation.”80 They held that a
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment “includes
not only what is owned but also, in some limited circumstances, what
is sought. This expanded concept of property, however, requires more
than ‘an abstract need or desire’ or ‘a unilateral expectation’ of what
is sought” because it requires “a legitimate claim of entitlement.”81
Despite this holding, the court had second thoughts and wondered
why courts could not recognize “the owner’s indisputable property
interest in the land he owns” as the basis for a substantive due
process claim.82 Their inquiry would then be whether “local
government has exceeded the limits of substantive due process in
regulating the plaintiff’s use of his property by denying the
application arbitrarily and capriciously.”83 This inquiry would not
require an entitlement to the land use approval. The court finally
decided it was committed to the entitlement rule, and that this rule
has a beneficial effect.84 Courts could apply the rule to reject
substantive due process claims without having to decide whether a
local government’s decision was arbitrary.
The court held that it would apply the entitlement rule with
considerable rigor: “[a]pplication of the test must focus primarily on
78. 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1989).
79. Id. at 911.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 915 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 917.
83. Id. (footnote omitted). The court quoted Justice Stevens, who has observed that “the
opportunity to apply for [a zoning] amendment is an aspect of property ownership protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 917-18 (quoting City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 683 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
84. Id. at 918. The court relied on one of its previous decisions, Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v.
Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1985).
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the degree of discretion enjoyed by the issuing authority, not the
estimated probability that the authority will act favorably in a
particular case.”85 There must be a “certainty or very strong
likelihood” that the local government would grant the land use
approval. This holding is an application of Supreme Court decisions
finding an entitlement does not exist when state law, such as a land
use ordinance, grants discretion to grant or deny a land use
application. Most courts follow RRI.86
The Third Circuit forcefully rejected the entitlement rule in
substantive due process cases brought by landowners. DeBlasio v.
Zoning Board of Adjustment for the Township of West Omwell 87 is
the leading case. A landowner sued a township’s zoning board of
adjustment and its members.88 He challenged the board’s decision
that the use of his property violated the zoning ordinance, and its
denial of a use variance request.89 After reviewing earlier cases in the
circuit that rejected the entitlement rule,90 the court concluded “that
ownership is a property interest worthy of substantive due process
protection.”91 It concluded that a landowner states a substantive due
process claim by alleging “that the decision limiting the intended land
use was arbitrarily or irrationally reached.”92 The court did not
explain why it rejected the entitlement rule, but observed in a
footnote that the Supreme Court had not decided whether the
entitlement rule applied to substantive due process claims.93 A
minority of courts follow DeBlasio.94
85. RRI, 870 F.2d at 918. The Second Circuit has since held that uncertainty in the
applicable law will also defeat the recognition of an entitlement to a land use approval. Natale
v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1999).
86. See supra note 78.
87. 53 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 1995).
88. Id. at 593-94.
89. Id. at 595-96.
90. The principal case was Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir. 1988), where the
municipality refused to issue a building permit.
91. DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 600 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 601 (footnote omitted).
93. Id. at n.9. The court quoted the observation from Roth that property “includes not only
what is owned but also, in some limited circumstances, what is sought.” 408 U.S. at 577.
94. See Dominion Cogen, D.C., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 878 F.Supp 258 (D.D.C.
1995); Zaintz v. City of Albuquerque, 739 F. Supp. 1462 (D.N.M. 1990) (holding that New
Mexico law recognizes the right to use property for a lawful purpose without restriction “for
arbitrary and discriminatory reasons by governmental zoning actions”). For Third Circuit
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III. DO LANDOWNER SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS FALL IN
THE ENTITLEMENT TRAP?
The question now is whether RRI and courts that followed it
correctly applied the entitlement rule of Roth and Perry. One problem
is that Roth and Perry were not substantive due process cases. They
considered procedural due process claims brought by jobholders who
lost their positions. The Court has not decided whether the rule
adopted by Roth and Perry for procedural due process cases should
also apply to substantive due process cases.
Another problem is that a landowner in a substantive due process
case has an old property right impaired by the denial of a land use
approval. In Roth and Perry the jobholders did not have an old
property right in the continuation of their employment. When a
landowner makes a takings claim based on the denial of a land use
approval, his old property right is enough to confer jurisdiction on a
court to hear the claim. The question remains whether an old property
right should also be enough for a substantive due process claim.
A. Substantive Due Process as Different
Whether the Court would apply the entitlement rule to substantive
due process claims brought by landowners is not clear. Opinions by
the Court and individual Justices point in both directions,95 and the
district court cases, see for example, Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d 537
(M.D. Pa. 1999), and Boudwin v. Great Bend Township, 921 F. Supp. 1326 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
95. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1873 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that there is no authority for the “startling proposition” that a liberty interest
has different meanings under substantive and procedural due process); County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (“stating that [t]he touchstone of due process is protection
of the individual against arbitrary action of government, whether . . . denial of fundamental
procedural fairness, or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the
service of a legitimate governmental objective. . ..”) (citations omitted); Zinermon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113, 124-27 (1990) (distinguishing substantive due process and pointing out that a
substantive due process violation is complete when a deprivation occurs, but a procedural due
process violation is not complete until a state deprives an individual of due process); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (stating that the categories of substantive
and procedural due process are distinct); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 120 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that aliens might have substantive liberty interests that a
statute cannot deny, but they have no liberty interests protected by procedural due process in
acquiring or retaining federal employment); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
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lower federal courts also disagree on whether substantive and
procedural due process are equivalent.96
However, the historic context of Roth and Perry suggests that the
Supreme Court would apply the entitlement rule in substantive due
process cases. These decisions came at the end of an era during
which the Court, under Chief Justice Warren, expanded constitutional
guarantees. Commentators explain these decisions as an attempt by
the Burger Court to limit the expansive doctrines that it inherited
from the Warren Court. It did this by adopting well-defined
boundaries to limit the cases in which these doctrines could apply.97
There is merit to this interpretation, which suggests that the Court
limited judicial intervention in governmental decision making by
adopting the entitlement rule. If this is so, the Court probably would
also apply the entitlement rule in substantive due process cases.
This interpretation is consistent with the logic of Roth and Perry.
In these cases the Court made it clear that proof of an entitlement
requires a hearing on job terminations but does not require an
employer to reinstate an employee.98 A landowner, however, brings a
substantive due process case to compel a land use approval, which is
the equivalent of an employee’s reinstatement. If the Court does not
require reinstatement when it finds an entitlement to a due process
hearing, it surely would not abandon the entitlement rule in a
substantive due process case where the landowner seeks a similar
result by compelling a land use approval.99
(holding that unjustifiable discrimination may violate due process).
96. E.g., Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a substantive due
process violation in a denial of a land use permit but applying the entitlement rule to reject a
procedural due process claim because the agency had discretion in deciding whether to issue it);
Zaintz v. City of Albuquerque, 739 F. Supp. 1462 (D.N.M. 1990) (noting the right of the
property owner to use property for a lawful purpose is a “‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ that
is constitutionally protected from arbitrary deprivation”).
See also Michael J. Phillips, The Substantive Due Process Rights of College and University
Faculty, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 567, 580 n.67 (1991) (noting that courts apply the entitlement rule to
substantive due process claims); Smolla, supra note 46, at 75 (arguing that cases reject a
distinction between substantive and procedural rights).
97. Rubin, supra note 57, at 1067; Smolla, supra note 46, at 77 n.32.
98. Proof of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement. It
would only obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request where he could be
informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency. Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 603.
99. Logically, courts should not even ask if an entitlement exists in a substantive due
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B. The Takings Analogy
The landowner who did not get her site plan approved in the
hypothetical at the beginning of this Article can also bring a takings
claim. Though her chances of success on this claim are problematic,
her old property interest provides a constitutional basis for bringing
her takings claim. The question is whether judicial recognition of old
property interests in takings cases means that courts should also
recognize old property interests as the basis for substantive due
process claims by landowners.
1. Investment-Backed and Unilateral Expectations
Where to begin in comparing as-applied substantive due process
with takings claims is a puzzle.100 As noted earlier, the Takings
Clause has a substantive element that asks whether a land use
regulation is legitimate.101 It also has a deprivation element that asks
whether the economic impact of a land use regulation on land is so
substantial that it amounts to a taking. This is the two-pronged Agins
test.102
Beyond the Agins test, if there is no per se taking the Court
applies a three-factor balancing test based on Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.103 In Penn Central the Court
held that the proper analysis for takings claims is done on a case-by-
case basis by considering the character of the governmental action,
the economic impact on the property owner, and the owner’s distinct
investment-backed expectations.104 Penn Central introduced
process case because the Court in Roth and Perry held only that proof of entitlement requires a
due process hearing, not a substantive result. They do not take this position, however, and
award a land use approval to the landowner if they find that the land use decision was arbitrary.
Courts may believe that they must grant this relief because they can find an entitlement only if
there is a mandatory duty to grant the approval. Because the duty is mandatory, a court can
compel an approval if it finds that the decision withholding the approval was arbitrary.
100. For Chief Justice Rehnquist’s views on the protection of property under the takings
and substantive due process clauses, see Stephen J. Massey, Justice Rehnquist’s Theory of
Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541 (1984).
101. See supra notes 28-24 and accompanying text.
102. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
103. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
104. Id. at 124.
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investment-backed expectations into takings law.
The link between takings law and the entitlement theory of Roth
and Perry lies in the investment-backed expectations takings factor.
Although the Court in Penn Central provided limited guidance on the
meaning of this phrase,105 it held that a landowner does not have
investment-backed expectations based solely on a belief that she
could probably develop her land.106 This holding is a link with the
Court’s holding in Roth, which states that expectations in an
employment position are not enough of a property interest for a
procedural due process claim. Similarly, mere expectations are not
enough for a takings claim; they must be investment-backed. The
analogy to the holding in Roth and Perry, that expectations are not
property rights, is clear.
What is not so clear is what landowners must prove to show they
have investment-backed expectations in takings cases. One
interpretation is that expectations are investment-backed when a
landowner has a vested right in her use of the property.107 This
interpretation is consistent with the comparable rule, that a
municipality must approve a development when a landowner has a
vested right in it.108
Another important rule that the Supreme Court applies to decide
when a landowner has investment-backed expectations is the notice
rule. Under this rule a landowner does not have investment-backed
expectations if he is on notice that land use regulations apply to his
105. The Court’s opinion indicated that investment-backed expectations were merely one
factor courts should consider when reviewing a takings claim, but later cases have held that a
failure to establish investment-backed expectations defeats a takings claim. See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (holding that “the force of this [investment-backed
expectations] factor is so overwhelming . . . that it disposes of the taking question”). See also
Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (concluding that a failure to show
investment-backed expectations defeated a takings claim).
106. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (holding the argument untenable that property owners
can establish a taking by showing they were denied a property interest they had believed was
available for development).
107. Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW.
215, 237-40 (1995). Not all courts require a vested right. Some find investment-backed
expectations if the property owner established a primary use of his property prior to the time a
municipality applied its land use regulations to deny permission to develop. Id. at 240-43. See
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. cl. 21 (1999) (finding investment-backed
expectations based on use of property at time of purchase).
108. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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property, and that a government agency may prohibit the
development of his land. The notice rule has the same effect as the
entitlement rule. It allows the government to decide, through its land
use regulations, when a landowner has investment-backed
expectations protected by the takings clause.
2. Investment-Backed Expectations, the Notice Rule, and
Government Benefits
a. Monsanto and the Notice Rule
The notice rule dates from a Supreme Court decision, Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co.109 Monsanto applied to the federal Environmental
Protection Agency to list a pesticide.110 As a condition to the listing,
the statute required the company to submit data concerning its
product, and allowed the EPA to use this data without Monsanto’s
permission after a designated period. Monsanto claimed that this
requirement was a taking of its property but the Court disagreed.111
The Court noted that Monsanto was aware that the statute
protected the data it supplied only for the statutory nondisclosure
period and determined that it was “entitled” to compensation only
until that period ended.112 If Monsanto submitted the necessary data
despite these limitations, it could “hardly argue” that its reasonable
investment-backed expectations were disturbed when the EPA
disclosed this data as authorized by law at the time of submission:
Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under
which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally
related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary
submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the
economic advantage of a registration can hardly be called a
taking.113
109. 467 U.S. 986.
110. Id. at 990.
111. Id. at 991.
112. Id. at 1006.
113. Id. at 1007 (citation omitted). Monsanto also made an argument that the data
disclosure requirement was an unconstitutional condition on the registration. Id. The Court
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This quotation provides the link between the notice rule as applied
to takings claims and the entitlement rule as applied to due process
claims. Whether a jobholder has an entitlement that requires a
hearing on job termination depends on whether he has a property
right in that job. State law defines and can defeat that property right.
Similarly, in Monsanto the conditions imposed by federal law on the
pesticide registration defined the company’s property right and
defeated its investment-backed expectations.114 The difference is that
the Court in Monsanto required notice of the regulations. The Court
did not discuss the notice problem in Roth and Perry, probably
because it is reasonable to assume an employee has notice of
conditions affecting his job.
Monsanto was not a land use case, but courts applied its notice
rule in land use cases where landowners filed a takings claim based
on a refusal to allow the development of their land. In these cases the
courts extended the notice rule to include constructive as well as
actual notice. If a landowner knew or should have known at the time
of purchase that land use regulations covered her property, she could
not claim investment-backed expectations if a government agency
later prohibited the development of her land. Courts especially
applied this rule in environmental regulation cases, where they
answered this objection by noting that Monsanto had not challenged the ability of the federal
government to regulate the marketing of pesticides, and that it could not do so because pesticide
regulation was part of the burdens all must bear in exchange for “‘the advantage of living and
doing business in a civilized community,’” Id. at 1007 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67
(1979)).
The Court’s answer is an application of the average reciprocity of advantage rule, which
the Supreme Court has adopted in cases, such as zoning cases, on the theory that the benefits of
a zoning ordinance match its burdens. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Waiving the Taking Clause:
Conflicting Signals from the Supreme Court, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING,
ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.01-04 (Carol J. Holgren et al. eds., 1995).
114. Like the entitlement rule, the notice rule is circular. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in
his concurring opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034
(1992): “There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course; for if the
owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of
governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it is.” Justice Kennedy added
that some circularity must be tolerated, that the definition is not circular in its entirety, and that
“[t]he expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective rules and customs that
can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.” Id. at 1035. The definition of property
rights in substantive due process cases, however, depends on whether the municipality
unilaterally decides to make its decision on a land use approval discretionary.
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viewed the purchase of sensitive land, such as wetlands, as a warning
that a government agency might prohibit its development.115
b. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
The Supreme Court soon had an opportunity, in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,116 to decide whether the notice rule
applied to land use takings claims. Recall that the commission
demanded an easement across the Nollan’s beachfront property as a
condition to the issuance of a building permit for a new dwelling.117
The Court held that this condition was a taking, but Justice Brennan’s
dissent argued that a taking had not occurred because the Nollans did
not have investment-backed expectations in the development
permit.118
In reaching this conclusion Justice Brennan observed that the
coastal law under which the coastal commission conditioned the
Nollan’s permit was in place when they applied for it.119 The
commission had required beach access under this law from the other
lot owners in the Nollan’s development.120 Justice Brennan also noted
that the coastal law authorized the beach access requirement, and
argued that this requirement served the legitimate governmental
purpose of ensuring public access to the beach. He concluded that the
Nollans “could have no reasonable expectation of, and had no
entitlement to, approval of their permit application” unless they
agreed to a deed restriction ensuring public access to the ocean.121
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, disagreed and rejected
Justice Brennan’s application of the notice rule:
But the right to build on one’s own property— even though its
exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting
115. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 31 WASH.
U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 29-35 (1987). E.g., Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd.,
485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984).
116. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
117. Id. at 827-28.
118. Id. at 861.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 855-56, 860.
121. 483 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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requirements— cannot be remotely described as a
“governmental benefit.” And thus the announcement that the
application for (or granting of) the permit will entail the
yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded as
establishing the voluntary “exchange,” that we found to have
occurred in Monsanto.122
This holding eliminates the rule that a takings claimant must have
a new property entitlement to a land use approval as the basis for a
takings claim. The entitlement rule is based on the principle that state
law can define a government benefit, such as employment, to
eliminate an entitlement interest. It does this by making the
availability of a benefit discretionary. In Justice Scalia’s words, this
is an “announcement” that acceptance of employment requires the
“yielding of a property interest” because government can exercise its
discretion to terminate the employment.123 Under Justice Scalia’s
footnote, no such rule applies under the Takings Clause. The “right to
build on one’s property” is not a government benefit, so the
government cannot eliminate that property right by announcing
conditions that defeat it, such as a requirement for beach access.
The real issue is the difference between old and new property. In
Roth and Perry the jobholders did not have an antecedent property
right in their positions. That is why the Supreme Court required them
to have an entitlement to their jobs as the basis for a property right. In
a land use case, the property owner has an antecedent property right
in the ownership of his land. The Nollan footnote means a land use
regulation cannot eliminate that property right by including
conditions that restrict it. Nollan thus contradicts the majority rule in
substantive due process cases that a land use regulation can defeat an
entitlement to a land use approval by requiring a discretionary
decision on the approval.
This argument is powerful but has its problems. An initial
122. Id. at 825 n.2. Justice Scalia also held the Nollans’ right to claim a taking was not
defeated simply because they acquired their property after the Commission began to implement
its beach access policy. Cases that apply the entitlement rule to substantive due process claims
in land use cases do not discuss Nollan. See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Village of Southampton,
870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1989), discussed in supra notes 78-85.
123. Id. at 833-34 n.2 (citation omitted).
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problem is that the basis for Justice Scalia’s footnote is as
problematic as the entitlement rule that the Court adopted in Roth and
Perry. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his Nollan dissent, he could
find no basis for the footnote except in some “natural rights” status,
which he doubted.124 Moreover, courts divide on whether to apply the
notice rule despite the footnote,125 and one court has explicitly
rejected it.126 Nevertheless, until the Court rejects the Scalia footnote,
it means that land use regulations cannot write the Takings Clause
out of existence by announcing restrictions that defeat investment-
backed expectations.127
124. Brennan, dissenting in Nollan, noted:
If the Court is somehow suggesting that ‘the right to build on one’s own property’ has
some privileged natural rights status, the argument is a curious one. By any traditional
labor theory of value justification for property rights, for instance, see, e.g., J. Locke,
The Second Treatise of Civil Government 15-26 (E. Gough, ed. 1947), Monsanto
would have a superior claim, for the chemical formulae which constitute its property
only came into being by virtue of Monsanto’s efforts.
483 U.S. at 860 n.10. As one reviewer who read a draft of this Article pointed out, the benefit of
registration in Monsanto was important primarily or only because it was required as a matter of
law to sell the product and is not essentially different from the “benefit” of a building permit.
125. Refusing to apply Nollan’s footnote 2 and holding that a landowner does not have
investment-backed expectations if he knew or should have known about the land use regulation
at the time of the purchase. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isle Assocs. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 340
(1998); National Adver. Co. v. Village of Downer’s Grove, 561 N.E.2d 1300 (Ill. App. 1990)
(involving sign regulations); Gazza v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 679 N.E.2d
1035 (N.Y. 1997); Brunelle v. Town of Kingston, 700 A.2d 1075 (R.I. 1997). But see
Cottonwood Farms v. Board of County Comm’rs, 763 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1988); Lopes v. City of
Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1994); East Cape May Assocs. v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl.
Protection, 693 A.2d 114 (N.J. App. Div. 1997). However, most courts have adopted the notice
rule in a very mechanical way, generally without citing and certainly without coming to grips
with Nollan’s footnote 2. But see Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (discussing why regulatory climate provided notice that defeated takings claim against
denial of permit in wetlands).
126. Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 316 n.3 (N.Y. 1997).
127. Regulatory uncertainty can still allow land use regulations to defeat a landowner’s
investment-backed expectations.
[R]egulatory uncertainty decides the level of regulatory risk assumed by a landowner
who enters a land market. The more opinion diverges on whether a landowner will
realize his investment-backed expectations in a land market the greater the risk he
assumes. It is fair to characterize the purchase of land when these market uncertainties
exist as speculative, and conclude that courts should not find a taking when this
speculative opportunity is denied.
Mandelker, supra note 107, at 234 (footnote omitted). See also Kim v. City of New York, 681
N.E.2d at 316 n.3 (rejecting Justice Scalia’s footnote). For a contrary view see Steven J. Eagle,
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3. Does the Definition of Property Under the Takings Clause
Apply to Substantive Due Process?
Justice Scalia’s footnote and the entitlement rule are problematic,
but both stand as accepted pronouncements by the Court. The next
question is whether the Court’s definition of property under the
Takings Clause should apply to its definition of property under
substantive due process.128 Again, there is no clear answer to this
question.
The Court has not considered this issue. In its most extensive
discussion of substantive due process and the Takings Clause, the
Court divided and did not decide whether old property is enough for a
substantive due process claim. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,129 a
federal statute retroactively demanded pension contributions from a
mining company.130 The Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional, but there was no majority decision.131 Four justices
held that the statute was a taking of property, while five justices
analyzed the case under substantive due process. In this second
group, only Justice Kennedy held that the statute was
unconstitutional.132
This difference in opinion on which clause applied gave the Court
an opportunity to explain the role of each clause as a constitutional
limitation. The application of the statute to a property interest that
The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating from the “Rule of Law,” 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 345, 367-73 (1998).
128. There is, of course, a distinction between the role of the entitlement rule in substantive
due process cases and the role of the investment-backed expectations takings factor in takings
cases. The entitlement rule is an absolute bar to litigating a substantive due process claim. The
accepted understanding is that investment-backed expectations are only a factor courts consider
when deciding whether a taking has occurred. A failure to establish investment-backed
expectations does not bar a landowner from making a takings claim, although it can defeat a
takings claim once a court hears it. This distinction should not make a difference, because the
common issue in both situations is the threshold definition of the property interest that is
entitled to constitutional protection. In addition, there is some indication that the absence of
investment-backed expectations may defeat a takings claim. See supra note 106.
129. 524 U.S. 498 (1998). For a discussion of this case, see Echeverria & Dennis, supra
note 23; Steven J. Eagle, Eastern Enterprises, Substantive Due Process, and a Coherent View of
Regulatory Takings, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
130. Id. at 504, 517.
131. Id. at 504.
132. Id. at 539.
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was not real property also gave the Court an opportunity to clarify the
role of the entitlement rule in defining property interests.133 It missed
both opportunities, though the opinions provide some limited
guidance on these issues.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion addressed the property
issue to some extent. He disagreed with the plurality’s decision that
the Takings Clause applied and held that a taking had not occurred
because the statute did not “operate upon or alter an identified
property interest.”134 He did not say whether that property interest
must be old property or new property.
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion examined the difference
between the Takings Clause and substantive due process.135 She
applied the old maxim that characterizes the basic issue under the
Takings Clause as justice and fairness.136 Though noting the takings
and due process clauses are “correlated to some extent,” she held that
substantive due process was inappropriate here, expressing concern
about using the “vague contours” of the due process clause to review
economic legislation.137 This holding shows misgiving about
returning to a Lochner era review of economic legislation, but it does
not address the property interest necessary for substantive due
133. In recent takings decisions the Court has cited Roth for the proposition that state law
defines property rights. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998)
(considering whether interest from clients that is earned in lawyer accounts but that will not be
returned to clients is property protected by takings clause); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that the takings clause does not require
compensation when the owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by existing
rules and understandings as defined by state law). The Court was not aware in these cases that
Justice Scalia rejected the Roth analysis in his definition of investment-backed expectations. For
an analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s views on the definition of property, which notes that he
applies old property concepts under the takings clause and new property concepts in procedural
due process cases, see Stephen J. Massey, supra note 100, at 553-55.
134. Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. See id. at 522-38.
136. Id. at 523 (“[T]he process for evaluating a regulation’s constitutionality involves an
examination of the ‘justice and fairness’ of the governmental action.”) (citing Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)). However, this takings maxim originated in Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”).
137. Id. at 537-38.
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process claims based on arbitrary government behavior.138
A forceful holding that old property interests are enough to
provide a basis for a constitutional challenge under both the Due
Process and Takings Clauses comes from the Seventh Circuit. In
River Park v. City of Highland Park, a landowner brought an action
in federal court claiming a violation of due process after a city
refused to rezone its property.139 Writing for the court, Judge
Easterbrook rejected the entitlement rule, considered the due process
claim, and explained the difference between old and new property:
Those things people can hold or do without the government’s
aid count as property or liberty no matter what criteria the law
provides. So, for example, the ability to work in the ordinary
occupations of the community is a liberty or property interest.
Otherwise a single local ordinance providing that “we may put
your land in any zone we want, for any reason we feel like”
would abolish all property rights in land overnight. The due
process and takings clauses are made of sterner stuff.140
IV. GETTING THE LANDOWNER’S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
CLAIM INTO COURT
This Article has discussed the entitlement rule courts apply to
dismiss landowner claims that a municipal land use decision violates
substantive due process because it is arbitrary. The basis for this rule
138. Justice Kennedy also examined the difference between the takings clause and
substantive due process. Relying on a decision that upheld a statute requiring employers
withdrawing from a pension plan to make payments to the plan, he stated “it would be
surprising to discover that there had been a taking in the instance where a due process attack
had been rejected.” Id. at 546. Justice Breyer’s dissent agreed. Id. at 554 (finding the takings
clause is concerned with providing compensation for legitimate government action that takes
private property to serve the public good). These statements ignore the second prong of Agins,
which requires compensation when a regulation deprives property of all economically viable
use. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
139. 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994).
140. Id. at 166 (citations omitted). However, the court rejected a claim that the city’s
refusal to rezone violated procedural due process. But see Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v.
Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 675-78 (3d Cir. 1991) (distinguishing takings cases and holding
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is problematic, but the argument for an alternative that rejects the
entitlement rule in substantive due process cases lacks a firm
foundation.
One problem is that the Supreme Court has not provided clear
guidelines on the role and the definition of the substantive Due
Process and Takings Clauses. There is confusion, for example, over
whether courts can review the purpose of a land use regulation under
both clauses or only under substantive due process. Neither has the
Court decided, as some circuits have, that a landowner cannot make a
substantive due process claim if he also has a takings claim.141 If not,
and if the landowner cannot challenge the purpose of a regulation
under the Takings Clause, then he has no opportunity to challenge the
legitimacy of a governmental land use decision. Similarly, the
landowner in the hypothetical at the beginning of this Article could
not challenge the disapproval of the site plan.
This confusion about the two clauses affects the Court’s view on
the property interest landowners must have to make a constitutional
claim under either clause. Although clarifying the role of each clause
may not influence the Court’s decision on the property interest
necessary for a constitutional claim, there can be no question that
clarification would help. For example, if landowners can challenge
the governmental purpose of a regulation under either clause,
conceptual symmetry argues that courts should apply the same
definition of property under both.142
Another major problem is that the entitlement rule allows courts
to avoid critical policy issues when they decide whether to allow
constitutional claims. This is possible because the entitlement rule is
circular. It allows a local government to define what it wants to
recognize as an entitlement through its land use ordinance by making
land use approvals discretionary.
Rules like the entitlement rule also reflect a longstanding judicial
dislike of land use cases. River Park is an example. Though the court
141. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
142. Conceptual symmetry does not mean that courts should adopt the takings clause
definition of property for substantive due process cases. However, the opposite result, that
courts would abandon their acceptance of old property under the takings clause and embrace the
new property entitlement rule, is unlikely.
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issued a ringing defense of property rights, it was uncompromising in
its belief that land use claims do not belong in federal court.143 Courts
sometimes express this concern another way, by holding that
landowners who are disappointed with local land use decisions
should not bring their disappointments into court as constitutional
arguments.144
If judicial dislike for land use cases can explain circular rules like
the entitlement rule, the next question is whether courts are justified
in this dislike. The answer lies in the difference between an
as-applied claim that a land use decision is arbitrary and a facial
claim against a land use regulation. There are reasons for limiting
judicial review when the issue is a facial claim that a land use
ordinance is unconstitutional, at least when there are no exclusionary
problems. Arbitrary decision making does not deserve this
exemption. In the site plan hypothetical, the local government had a
legitimate land use policy in its site plan requirement but applied that
policy arbitrarily.
Section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act provides another
perspective on how courts view municipal responsibility for
constitutional violations.145 Section 1983 provides the judicial remedy
for local government wrongdoing that triggers constitutional claims,
including substantive due process claims. An important question
under § 1983 is whether local governments have a qualified
immunity from liability, or whether they are absolutely liable for
their constitutional violations. Qualified immunity would restrict
local government liability under § 1983 because it would exempt a
local government if its actions, though unconstitutional, were done in
good faith.
143. “Federal courts are not boards of zoning appeals. This message, oft-repeated, has not
penetrated the consciousness of property owners who believe that federal judges are more
hospitable to their claims than are state judges. Why they should believe this we haven’t a clue;
none has ever prevailed in this circuit, but state courts often afford relief on facts that do not
support a federal claim.” River Park, 23 F.3d at 164.
144. “[Courts should not] endow every disappointed property owner with a section 1983
claim, because every appeal from an adverse ruling necessarily encompasses a claim that the
determination by the local agency was, from the owner’s point of view, irrational, arbitrary,
capricious and an abuse of the agency’s discretion.” Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar, 81
Cal. Rptr. 2d 324, 335 (Cal. App. 1998).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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The Supreme Court rejected qualified immunity in Owen v. City
of Independence, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan.146 A city
manager, in a case remarkably like Roth and Perry, discharged a
police chief. The city manager had previously rejected his request for
notice of the charges against him, a public hearing, and a reasonable
opportunity to respond to those charges. The court of appeals applied
a good faith immunity rule to hold that the city was not liable because
the discharge had occurred before the Supreme Court decided Roth
and Perry,147 but the Supreme Court reversed. It held that local
governments are absolutely liable for constitutional violations under
§ 1983.
Justice Brennan’s policy reasons for holding local governments
absolutely liable conflict dramatically with his reasons for allowing
the coastal commission to escape a takings claim in Nollan. He held
that it would be wrong for local governments to avoid liability under
§ 1983 for injury they inflict. He then added that “[a] damages
remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any
scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.”148
Brennan also found that rejecting a qualified good faith immunity
for damages caused by constitutional violations harmonized well with
developments in common law. He relied on tort law for this holding,
a defensible comparison because the Supreme Court views § 1983 as
the equivalent of a tort remedy.149 Tort law doctrines had changed,
Justice Brennan argued, and so should doctrines defining
governmental responsibility. Individual blameworthiness was no
longer the test of liability: “[T]he principle of equitable loss-
spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of
official misconduct.”150
146. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
147. Id. at 630 n.10.
148. Id. at 651.
149. As the Court pointed out in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687
(1999): “[T]here can be no doubt that claims brought pursuant to § 1983 sound in tort. Just as
common-law tort actions provide redress for interference with protected personal or property
interests, § 1983 provides relief for invasions of rights protected under federal law.” 526 U.S. at
709.
150. Owen, 445 U.S. at 657. This principle is similar to the “fairness” principle that is the
basis for compensation under the takings clause. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Justice Brennan’s views on municipal liability see Joan C. Williams, The
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One problem with relying on this reasoning to reject the
entitlement rule is that Owen dealt with municipal liability for
constitutional violations not with access to the courts to litigate
constitutional claims.151 Nevertheless, § 1983 provides the judicial
remedy for constitutional claims,152 so Owen is relevant to the
entitlement rule because this rule eliminates a judicial remedy in
substantive due process cases. If a good faith immunity that would
limit governmental responsibility for constitutional violations is
unacceptable, then an entitlement rule is also unacceptable. This rule
allows governments to escape responsibility for substantive due
process violations by denying plaintiffs access to the courts.153
Loss distribution as a public policy may require more analysis
than the Court gave it in Owen,154 but it significantly undercuts an
entitlement rule that bars substantive due process claims by
landowners.155 An entitlement rule prevents courts from attempting
loss distribution because it allows them to dismiss claims that a land
use decision violated substantive due process without reaching the
Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in
American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83 (1986).
151. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989) (distinguishing availability of
§ 1983 as remedy for failure to train from the constitutional violation).
152. Section 1983 is the remedy plaintiffs must use to assert substantive due process
claims. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 n.23 (Brennan J.,
dissenting) (landowner may have a damages cause of action under section 1983 when a police
power regulation not enacted to further public health, safety, morals, or general welfare).
153. The tort analogy used by Justice Brennan in Owen is especially relevant to claims that
a land use disapproval violated substantive due process. Arbitrary decision making is clearly
analogous to the kind of conduct that constitutes a tort.
154. For a discussion of these problems under the takings clause, see Michael A. Heller &
James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997
(1999).
155. Whether loss distribution should triumph over caseload reduction as the dominant
social policy is, of course, a value judgment. The Owen decision is evidence that the Court
believes it should. In one part of his opinion, Justice Brennan discussed the qualified good faith
immunity the Court had provided for local officials. He noted that the Court provided this
immunity because the Court believed it was unjust to subject an officer, who is required by law
to exercise discretion, to legal liability. The Court also believed that a threat of liability would
deter officers from fulfilling their office “with the decisiveness and the judgment required by
the public good.” Owen, 445 U.S. at 654. Neither of these concerns, he explained, applied to
local government. The first did not apply because the “public at large” enjoys the benefit of
government activities, so it is the public at large that should be liable for its administration. The
second did not apply, in part, because consideration of the municipality’s liability for
constitutional violations is “quite properly” the concern of elected or appointed officials. Id.
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merits. This result is efficient if it eliminates suits that do not present
valid constitutional claims, but it is inequitable because it prevents
courts from hearing claims that may be valid. Courts should have the
opportunity to decide these claims without the convenience of
ordering dismissal because a landowner does not have the required
new property.
No one gains in a legal environment where landowners suffer
from arbitrary decision making or, conversely, where constitutional
restrictions prevent necessary planning and land use regulation.
Effective judicial review can establish constitutional guidelines that
assure fair decisions and provide the necessary framework for land
use policies.156 Access to the courts is essential for judicial review.
The entitlement rule denies landowners that access when they claim
that a land use decision violates substantive due process. The
constitutional basis for this rule is problematic and courts should
abolish it.
156. Providing the necessary doctrinal framework for judicial review is also essential if
courts are to achieve these objectives. A colleague and I argued elsewhere that effective judicial
review requires a reversal of the presumption of constitutionality when governments abuse their
land use authority, and we outlined when we believe a reversal is proper. See Daniel R.
Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law,
24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992).
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